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DELIBERATING ABOUT DELIBERATION
Frederick Schauer*
WE THE PEOPLE: 1: FOUNDATIONS. By Bruce Ackerman. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp. x,
369. $24.95.

It starts on the cover. Before the reader of Bruce Ackerman's We
the People 1 even gets past the dustjacket, she is confronted with a late
eighteenth-century aquatint entitled Election Day at the Statehouse,
portraying a street scene in front of the Pennsylvania statehouse on
election day. The artwork perfectly exemplifies a major theme of the
book, in that it portrays most of the features that we associate with
public political deliberation. One person is holding up a banner. Another is making a political speech to an audience questioning and responding to the speaker. Several people carry handwritten or simply
printed political tracts, a number of small groups are engaged in serious discussion, and a somber and elderly gentleman is plainly dispensing the political wisdom he has accumulated over many decades.
Although the participants are all white, the presence of clearly engaged women and children makes the point that active participation is
not limited to those who then had the franchise.
It's a nice picture. Indeed, without explicitly referring to this
cover at all, Ackerman himself describes
a pretty picture ... in which a rediscovered Constitution is the subject of
an ongoing dialogue amongst scholars, professionals, and the people at
large; an America in which this dialogue between theory and practice
allows the citizenry, and its political representatives, a deepening sense of
its historical identity as it faces the transforming challenges of the future.
[p. 5]

Although much in this book is worthy of note, I want to concentrate on Ackerman's pervasive and self-conscious treatment of this deliberative ideal, one that stresses public discourse as a method of value
formation and governance, and one that dominates not only the picture on the cover, not only this book, and not only much of Ackerman's work, but also much of contemporary constitutional and
political theory. For although the normative desirability of deliberation in the ideal setting that this book's cover portrays is hard to chal• Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment and Professorial Fellow of the Joan
Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. This review has benefited from conversations with and comments by
Sanford Levinson, who still thinks I've got it all wrong.
1. Bruce A. Ackerman is Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University.
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lenge, more difficult issues arise when nonideal deliberative settings
reinforce rather than mitigate the darker side of public political life.
To the extent that this occurs, deliberation may present problems
rarely addressed in the celebrations of deliberation that dominate so
much of contemporary constitutional and political theory.
I

In concentrating on deliberation, certainly one of Ackerman's
main themes, I slight two others that deserve some note. One, the
most explicit in the book, is Ackerman's description and endorsement
of what he calls "dualist" democracy. Ackerman first distinguishes
dualism from monism, the more conventional majoritarian conception
of democracy that stresses the role of elections and the relationship
between the political legitimacy of a program and the success of its
promoters in "the last general election" (p. 8). To the monist, departures from majoritarianism are suspect, and the common phrase
"countermajoritarian difficulty" suggests that when an institution
(such as judicial review) operates other than to reinforce the results of
the last general election, its legitimacy is suspect and in need of affirmative justification.2
Ackerman's dualist challenge to monism rests on the premise that
the unique contribution of American political thought lies in its rejection of the European model of parliamentary sovereignty. Consequently, Ackerman makes the empirical claim that Americans are not
normally very much involved in the political decisions that affect
them, the interpretive claim that this degree of noninvolvement in normal politics is consistent with American constitutional and political
history, and the normative claim that such a state of affairs is nothing
to worry about. Dualism is based on the proposition that not being
politically involved on a regular basis is a perfectly legitimate life
choice, that it is the life choice of most Americans, and that governance on the normal track proceeds by virtue of the hopefully publicminded performance of duties by political professionals who use their
own best judgment subject only to sporadic electoral validation or invalidation. Normal politics is, with the consent of the people, largely
the business of the politicians.
But sometimes things are different. On occasion the people become mobilized, creating and participating in a public-minded and actively engaged process of "higher lawmaking" that produces
constitutional transformation. This process of higher lawmaking has
produced - and indeed constitutes - the Constitution, which consists of some combination of canonical texts, interpretive cases, and
2. See especially ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CoNSENT (1975); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
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political understandings. Because these and only these products truly
represent the considered wishes of the people, judicial enforcement of
the products of higher lawmaking - even to strike down the "products
of normal politics
cannot fairly be described as
countermajoritarian. Rather, judicial review is the way in which the
population keeps watch on the process between those less frequent
times when it desires to become more actively engaged (pp. 9-10, 13962, 266-319).
Dualism differs not only from monism, but also from what Ackerman calls "rights foundationalism," 3 the view that there are human
rights antecedent to the decisions of a given polity and, further, that
the enforcement of those rights is a significant part of a proper understanding of American constitutionalism. In contrast to rights foundationalism, dualism treats as paramount the decisions of the people so
long as they are made on the constitutional track, and thus requires
the courts to enforce even those decisions of the people that the rights
foundationalist would see as immoral violations of fundamental
human rights (pp. 10-16).
Ackerman's distinction between dualism and monism seems sensible enough,4 but his treatment of rights foundationalism is curious. At
various times Ackerman offers some half hearted sympathy with
rights foundationalism, especially when he argues that he would have
no objection to the entrenchment of constitutional rights against even
constitutional change, 5 but the general tenor of this book plainly
3. Pp. 10-16. Foundationalism is a bit of a pejorative in some modern legal and political
theory, e.g.• DON HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: JUSTIFICATION IN PoLmCAL THEORY
(1985), and perhaps another term would have been preferable. Although some people who believe in prepolitical rights believe that those rights include or are limited to rights of property, not
all so-called "foundationalists" take their guide exclusively from Locke and Lochner. Instead, as
Ackerman quite properly recognizes, theorists like Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls, neither of
whom places property rights near the center of his project, are foundationalists in Ackerman's
sense. So also, I should note, are most of those who can talk without difficulty about international human rights.
4. By which I mean that I think I agree with it, and I think as well that agreement with it
undergirds far more of American constitutional theory than Ackerman seems to acknowledge.
Although I agree with him that actual governmental practice seems hardly to justify the adulation and concomitant presumption of validity that pervades too much of the majoritarian tradition, I am not sure why those who would have the Court apply the text of the Constitution with
some vigor but be reluctant to depart from it, see, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981), cannot also be seen as dualists in Ackerman's precise
sense. Given that both Ely and Ackerman see the roots and legitimacy of judicial review in
terms of judicial enforcement of considered and entrenched popular choices, the difference between them turns on the question, which I take up below, whether those choices may be entrenched other than through the procedures of Article V. This is an important question, but
nevertheless the difference between Ackerman and most modern constitutional majoritarians is
considerably less than Ackerman supposes.
5. Pp. 15-16, 319-22. Neither Ackerman nor I is a logician, but the logical paradoxes of
entrenchment and self-amendment are worth noting. Can that part of a written constitution
making all or part of the same document unamendable be amended? See, e.g., Denis V. Cowan,
The Entrenched Sections of the South Africa Act, 10 S. AFRICAN L.J. 238 (1953). If so, then
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clashes with the notion that there is enforceable law higher than the
people's constitutional decisions. This tension strikes me as curious
for several reasons. First, the rejection of rights foundationalism, at
least as a point about metaethics and moral epistemology and not a
point only about the power of the courts, causes one to wonder from
whence comes the normative value of Ackerman's deliberative ideal.
Moreover, the rejection of rights foundationalism presents a difficulty
in explaining how the nonfoundationalist argues that we ought to have
these rights and not those, for such arguments need some pre-deliberative purchase. Finally, Ackerman's rejection of rights foundationalism
avoids the question why rights foundationalism has been rejected.
Ackerman's answer appeals to tradition, relying on American constitutional and political history to make the claim that, whatever the allure of rights foundationalism, it is not now and has never been the
approach adopted by the people of the United States in understanding
their Constitution (pp. 13-16).
To the rights foundationalist, however, this is no answer at all. If
there are rights antecedent to the decisions of the people, the absence
of any popular decision to recognize those rights, even over an entire
constitutional tradition, is hardly even persuasive, let alone dispositive.
In the context of questions about international human rights, a context
in which rights foundationalism is increasingly a global ideal, a nation's wholesale denial of a body of rights thus appears only as evidence of that nation's failure. One rarely hears arguments against
condemning or sanctioning a nation because it has merely failed to
enforce the rights that its constitutional tradition does not recognize.
To the rights foundationalist, the morally responsible agent must
act consistently with those rights of others that exist prior to and
above the decisions of the political state. If that rights foundationalist
entrenchment is illusory. If not, then why not? One answer is that there would be no procedure
in the document for such amendment. But then the entire document could be replaced by one
that resembled the original one in all respects except for the relevant amendment. In that case,
the same type of political decision that caused the constitution to be the constitution in the first
place could change that constitution, even those parts of the constitution that seemed explicitly
unamendable. So entrenchment turns out to be less a legal concept than a political fact, but if it
is a political fact then it may be so even if a constitutional text does not have explicit entrenchment provisions. As an example, note the recent debates about amending the First Amendment,
particularly in the context of the defeated H.J. Res. 350 and S.J. Res. 332 (1990), both of which
sought to overturn the result in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). Although the
First Amendment is not one of the two or three explicitly unamendable provisions of the U.S.
Constitution (Article V provides that no amendment shall deprive a state without its consent of
its equal representation in the Senate and that no amendment can alter those provisions allowing
slavery until the year 1808; somewhat more ambiguously, Article VI provides that "no religious
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office •.•), the public and political discourse
leading up to the recent rejection of the so-called Flag Burning Amendment lends support to the
view that the First Amendment is politically even if not textually entrenched. Ackerman himself
should be sympathetic to this claim, since, if the Constitution can be amended outside of the
provisions of Article V, then parts of the Constitution might be entrenched outside of the provisions of Article V. I pursue this issue further below, infra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
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rejects a strong sense of role morality, pursuant to which certain roles
preclude agents from enforcing the rights they would enforce if they
did not occupy those roles, then she will at least avoid contravening
those Jj.ghts regardless of the role she holds. 6 Therefore, even if the
rights foundationalist is a judge, she will not - in judging or elsewhere - take actions inconsistent with the antecedent rights she recognizes. And if told that most of the society in which she operates has
not recognized antecedent rights in general or some particular antecedent right, she is likely to respond that this is no argument against
either their existence or her enforcement of them.
This is not to say that rights foundationalism is right or wrong.
Nor is it to say that Ackerman might not be correct in his interpretive
claims about what is at the heart of the American political and constitutional tradition. But unlike his predecessors in the enterprise of offering comprehensive and profound accounts of the American
constitutional tradition, 7 Ackerman's historical, explanatory, and interpretive claims have an explicit normative overlay. Political and
constitutional prescription dominates this book in a way that it does
not dominate others to which it otherwise might be compared. As a
result, Ackerman's normative claims invite normative and not merely
historical or interpretive evaluation. When we use normative terms to
evaluate Ackerman's normative claims, we see that his observation
that this society has in its constitutional text8 and tradition rejected
rights foundationalism is, even if empirically correct, question-begging
in the extreme. There are strong arguments against foundationalism,
but one that takes antifoundationalism as its unargued premise is
hardly likely to persuade the foundationalist.
II

As in his previous work, 9 Ackerman makes much of those moments of great constitutional engagement that have produced extratextual constitutional transformations. In particular, he sees both the
6. On role morality, see FRANCIS H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 160 (2d ed. 1927) (viewing morality form the perspective of "my station and its duties"). For skepticism about role
morality, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusncE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988). See also
THOMAS NAGEL, Ruthlessness in Public Life, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 75 (1979) (discussing the
differences between private and public, role-centered morality).
7. E.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1912);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969).
8. In light of Ackerman's own endorsement of the idea of amendments outside of Article V,
it is intriguing that he relies almost exclusively on the text in comparing the American rejection
of entrenchment with the German acceptance of it. If the Constitution can be amended outside
of Article V, then it can be amended outside of Article V to entrench all or part of itself. If so, it
is possible, as some of the flag-desecration debates suggest, that parts of the Constitution are
already entrenched. See supra note 4.
·
9. E.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013 (1984); Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164
(1988).
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Reconstruction and the New Deal as periods in which popular engagement on the higher constitutional track has properly produced radical
revisions not only in the way the Constitution was viewed, but also
and consequently in the Constitution itself (pp. 81-130). And
although the Reconstruction period produced the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the New Deal was no less a transformation for having produced no modifications to the text of the
document.
As a matter of legal theory this is plainly right. As Hans Kelsen
first recognized in his discussion of the Grundnorm, 10 and as H.L.A.
Hart thereafter elaborated in his treatment of the ultimate rule of recognition, 11 laws gain legal validity by virtue of other and higher laws.
When this progression runs out, however, leaving in question only the
validity of the highest law of all, the notion of legal validity is meaningless. The validity (if that is even the right word at this point) of the
highest law - and thus of the legal system itself - is a political and
sociological fact and not a legal question. 12 I could write a constitution tomorrow, literally appearing in all respects to be a constitution
for the United States, and could incorporate within it conditions for its
technical validity (when I sign it, or when the Yankees next win the
World Series, for example) that would differ in no logical or textual
way from the internal validity conditions contained in Article VII of
the existing Constitution of the United States and satisfied in 1787.
Thus the two documents would appear equally internally valid. An
English-speaking visitor from Mars, for example, would not be able to
discern merely from examining the documents and being told that
each of their internal conditions for validity had been satisfied which
one really constituted the constitution of the United States.
The reason, of course, that our visitor from Mars would be confused is that the acceptance of the Philadelphia-generated Constitution
of the United States and not Fred's constitution of the United States as
the constitution of the United States is a political and sociological fact.
It is not a legal matter at all, but rather a set of circumstances about
the empirical conditions under which a population and its officials
treat the indications of a piece of paper as relevant.1 3
Once we see this, a number of conclusions follow. First, a whole
.range of understandings about what the Constitution says, including,
for example, how we treat Supreme Court decisions, how we treat
lower court decisions, how we treat historical executive and legislative
10. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945);
HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., 1970).
11. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-120, 245-46 (1961).
12. See Iain Stewart, The Basic Norm as Fiction, 1980 JURJD. REV. 199.
13. In somewhat different terms, this is what I see as one of the significant messages of SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
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practices, the relevance of original intent, and why Ronald Dworkin is
an acceptable citation in a Supreme Court opinion and Jeanne Dixon
is not, are determined by the political and social decisions that produce the fact of those sources' acceptance or rejection. Second, if all of
these are "part of" the Constitution, or not, because of supratextual or
extratextual social decisions, then when society modifies its decisions
in this regard the Constitution in any interesting sense changes as
well. 14 Third, if the "small c" constitutionality of the "big C" Constitution is a matter of social acceptance or nonacceptance, then there is
no formal or logical reason why social acceptance or nonacceptance
must necessarily be all-or-nothing. The social act that produces social
acceptance could be a social act of accepting two thirds or three
quarters or all but one provision of a particular text that happens to be
headed "The Constitution of the United States." If the Grundnorm or
the ultimate rule of recognition recognized all of the Constitution of
the United States except the Third Amendment as the constitution of
the United States, we would then say, neither illogically nor inconsistently with these enduring lessons from two of the great figures of
modern jurisprudence, that the constitution of the United States consists of all of those provisions contained in a document headed the
Constitution of the United States except for that part designated as
"Amendment III."
If the legal theory of social subtraction from the textual constitution is thus sound, then there is also no reason to suppose that there
could not be an equally sound legal theory of social addition. 15 As
long as society by its political act, and not the text by its own words,
determines that the text, and how much of it, counts as the constitution, then society could by a parallel political act also determine that
all of that text, and more, counts as the constitution of the United
States. Indeed, the constitution of the United States might plausibly
consist of the text of the Constitution itself; the Federalist Papers,·
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution of the United
States; and parts of the Mayflower Compact, the Declaration of Independence, and the Emancipation Proclamation.
14. This leads to difficult questions about when we can and cannot say that a legal order or
constitutional system has changed or remained the same. See J.M. Finnis, Revolutions and Con·
tinuity ofLaw, in OXFORD EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 44 (2d series, A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973).
Although this may seem like a substantively irrelevant semantic excursus, the question whether
today's legal order is the "same" as yesterday's despite some changes has great import in the
context of the question of the persistence of prerevolutionary laws after a legal and political
revolution. See F.M. Brookfield, The Courts, Ke/sen, and the Rhodesian Revolution, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 326 (1969); J.W. Harris, When and Why Does the Grundnorm Change?, 29 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 103 (1971). The relevance of this question to current issues regarding Eastern
Europe, the former Soviet Union, and South Africa should be apparent.
15. On the possibilities of extra-textual addition and subtraction, see Sanford Levinson, Accounting For Constitutional Change (Or, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution
Been Amended? (A) <26; (BJ 26; (C) >26 (DJ All of the Above), 8 CONST. COMMENT. 409
(1991).
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Ackerman is thus right in maintaining that there can be amendments to the Constitution outside of Article V, even though his insight
is perhaps less novel to the traditional legal theorist than to the modern American constitutionalist. 16 And to suppose that the period of
Reconstruction and the New Deal Era produced such amendments is
hardly implausible. But it is also possible that there were other extratextual amendments, or even that the process of extratextual
amendment is continuous. The plainly publicly engaged process constitutional politics - that led to the denial of confirmation of
Judge Bork, for example, may itself have been a process of extratextual amendment 17 that made rights foundationalism, for example,
somewhat more a part of the Constitution than it had been previously
(and than Ackerman would suppose). And it is further possible that
the "natural rights" debate accompanying Justice Thomas's confirmation was also a constitutional moment (or might have become so, were
it not overshadowed by other events) that led to somewhat less rights
foundationalism than had existed in the era after Bork but before
Thomas. 18
Acknowledging the continually evolving character of the
Grundnorm that supports the constitutionality of the Constitution is
consistent with Ackerman's notion of amendments outside Article V
- but less so with the stress that Ackerman places on a small number
of constitutional moments different in kind from other constitutional
transformations. Although Ackerman gives us criteria for when
higher lawmaking exists, and thus may be enforced by the courts even
if not consistent with Article V, he fails to come to grips with the
political and constitutional import of shifts in background understandings that do not meet these criteria. To appreciate this problem, it
might be useful to draw a distinction between how the Constitution
looks to the external observer and how it looks to a court considering
whether to invalidate the product of a legislature. With respect to the
former, it seems implausible to suppose that the Constitution changes
16. In the existing literature, the most jurisprudentially sophisticated treatment of constitutional transformations in the American context is Robert Justin Lipkin's. See Robert J. Lipkin,
The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, 68 NEB. L. REv. 701 (1989); Robert J. Lipkin, Con·
ventionalism, Pragmatism, and Constitutional Revolutions, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645 (1988);
see also Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55
U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988).
17. Ackerman describes the Bork nomination fight as a "failed constitutional moment." P.
56. But what was a failure for the President who nominated Bork may have been a success to
Bork's opponents. My point is that in Ackerman's terms the defeat of Bork may have been more
than just an attempt at a constitutional moment that misfired, but rather a constitutional moment that succeeded in entrenching the idea of unenumerated rights in general and the right to
privacy in particular, as subsequent nomination hearings have made clear.
18. See Robert F. Nagel, No Show: Reform the Hearings, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 1991, at
20; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Supreme Disappointment: What's Really Wrong with the Way We Choose
Supreme Court Justices, AM. LAW., Nov. 1991, at 5; The Thomas Nomination, NEW REPUBLIC,
Oct. 7, 1991, at 7.
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only when either amended under Article V or by those few constitutional moments that satisfy Ackerman's criteria. But even if constitutional transformation is more fluid than sporadic, Ackerman could
still maintain that a court self-consciously considering invalidating the
products of a political process needs firmer moorings. He could argue
that courts need criteria of constitutional recognition, some way of
demarcating between those subtle shifts that transform all participants
in a process and those more dramatic ones that change how an institution will see its own role. Otherwise, he might say, courts would see
themselves as constrained only by the operation of an external political
process, doing whatever they could get away with and in the process
defining constitutionalism and their role only by the after-the-fact empirical identification of what they did get away with. Such an outlook,
as the standard critiques of Realism make clear, would be of little help
from the standpoint of the judge trying to decide what to do. 19 In
order to avoid this problem, Ackerman's position might include both
the normative claim that judges should respect only those extratextual
modifications of the text that satisfy his criteria, and the descriptive
claim that they have in fact generally done so.
Although I have serious problems with the descriptive claim, 20 I
want to focus instead on the normative. If courts operating in dualist
mode should respect all of the products of normal politics except when
those products interfere with the mandate of a textualized or nontextualized constitutional moment, then we need a normative account of
why this should be so. Such an account would have to have two components, each of which suggests a possible alternative to Ackerman's
perspective. One component would question the court's unwillingness
to intervene in cases of normal politics, and here the rights foundationalist becomes a major figure. If normal politics generates a result that
a court perceives to be morally wrong but that a constitutionally engaged public has never previously perceived to have been morally
wrong, then judicial intervention without something that looks like
rights foundationalism becomes puzzling.
Take, for example, Ackerman's defense of Griswold v. Connecticut. 21 Because he rejects rights foundationalism, and because nothing
19. See HART, supra note 10, at 121-50. Hart's critique is adopted in Ronald Dworkin's
rejection of "external skepticism." RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 34-35 (1986). On the
crucial question of "standpoint," and on how the soundness of Legal Realism necessarily depends on standpoint, see WILLIAM TwINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
20. Descriptively I do not challenge Ackerman's argument that a constitutional moment in
his sense is a sufficient condition for judicial use of the substantive transformations of that moment. I do challenge, however, the view that constitutional moments are necessary conditions,
and I believe instead that judges' views of the Constitution's substance and sources of interpretation change far more frequently than the focus on constitutional moments would indicate.
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), discussed at pp. 150-62; see also Richard J. Fallon, Jr., Common
Law Court or Council of Revision, 101 YALE L.J. 949, 969 n.109 (1992) (book review). Acker-
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resembling Griswold-variety privacy was ever at the fore of public debate during a process of constitutional lawmaking, Ackerman's defense must rely on what seems to me to be a strained interpretation of
what the people were actually talking about in 1787, 1791, 1866, or
1937. Now others would describe what seems to me to be strained as
"creative," but here that is exactly the point, because then Ackerman
needs to claim not only that the people did such-and-such during their
constitutional moment, but also that they authorized the court to interpret what they did with a considerable degree of creativity. Then
things get even more sticky. If the people authorized the kind of creative synthesis that gets from the text, the founding, Reconstruction,
and the New Deal to Griswold, then why not just say that the people
authorized what is in effect rights foundationalism? If courts are authorized by and in the name of the people to identify rights that the
people in their own constitutional moments did not identify, then judicial power turns out to emanate from the authority of the courts in
Dworkinian fashion to make the people's actual choices the best they
can be. 22
•
Two further possibilities present themselves. One can, like Dworkin, be without embarassment a rights foundationalist of sorts, taking
the court's power to operate in this way to be right because it is right,
and not only because the people have deliberatively authorized that
course. But if there is space between Ackerman and Dworkin - and
much of Ackerman's interpretive method strikes me as quite
Dworkinian - it is precisely because of the difference between moral
rectitude and popular deliberative authorization. Ackerman's normative preference for the latter, however, risks some self-contradiction.
If the people have authorized rights foundationalism, then on a dayto-day (or even year-to-year) basis, nothing turns on the difference between dualism and rights-foundationalism except the formal power of
the people to withdraw their authorization for rights foundationalism
in the latter case but not in the former. But Ackerman's rejection of
rights foundationalism is stronger, for he wants to claim that the people have not authorized the courts to engage in that process at all. If
the people have not authorized rights foundationalism, but have engaged in the process of authorizing courts to create an interpretive
synthesis out of what they have explicitly done, then Ackerman must,
as both Dworkin and his critics have, take on the serious issue of the
role of morality in interpretation, in light of the fact that the available
interpretive field will underdetermine the result, just as any available
field of data will underdetermine the interpretation or explanation of
man's denial that Griswold and Brown are much more than reinforcements of then.existing con·
stitutional understandings is powerfully criticized in Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible
Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893 (1990).
22. DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 225-75; see also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRIN·
CIPLE 119-77 (1985).

May 1992)

Deliberating About Deliberation

1197

that data. 23
But if what the people have actually deliberated about is subject to
interpretation so as to include what they have not explicitly deliberated about, then what role is deliberation playing? It must play a big
role for Ackerman, because only deliberation separates him from the
rights foundationalists who would reach the same result in Griswold
without needing to see the result as the product of a series of deliberations. Moreover, it is what privileges the constitutional moments over
normal politics. If Ackerman were, like Ely and others, to offer an
account of textual exclusivity, he could rely less on the virtues of deliberation.24 But because for Ackerman some but not all extra-textual
political events rise to constitutional proportion, and because the distinction between those that do and those that do not turns on the presence or absence of widespread and engaged public deliberation of a
certain sort, then we must turn to the second component of the underpinnings of Ackerman's normative claims and ask, in a nonquestionbegging way, what is so special about deliberation?

III
So what is so unique about deliberation and its products, making
deliberation of a certain kind, but nothing else, a sufficient condition
for constitutional transformation? We can approach the question in
two ways. One would start with the premise that deliberation just is
democracy, and that Ackerman is following Alexander Meiklejohn in
seeing the population as a New England town meeting writ large.25
Meiklejohn recognized, however, that New England town meetings
take place once a year, with "normal politics" taking place between
town meetings with little popular involvement. But if Ackerman is
operating within the Meiklejohnian tradition, we may ask what is so
good about a New England town meeting (a question more likely to be
asked by those who have attended one). The New England town
meeting does provide an exercise in engaged majoritarianism, but why
do we think that is a good thing?
It might be good for one of four reasons. First, majoritarianism
fosters an independent value of equality, for a system in which everyone participates equally serves equality values independent of the results of the participation. Second, majoritarianism serves an
independent value of self-government, here seen as the political exten23. See Lawrence A. Alexander & Michael D. Bayles, Hercules or Proteus? The Many Theses ofRonald Dworkin, 5 Soc. THEORY & PRACTICE 267 (1980); Frederick Schauer, An Essay on
Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797, 814-21 (1982); A.D. Woozley, No Right Answer, in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 173 (Marshall Cohen ed.,
1983).
24. E.g.• pp. 197-99.

25. ALEXANDER MEIKLE10HN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948).
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sion of individual freedom in the sense of the ability to make decisions
about one's own life. Third, majoritarianism might, for those who reject foundationalism or any other conception of prepolitical rights antecedent to political decision, be the only way to define rights. Fourth,
even if majoritarianism (or consensus, which is similar but hardly
identical) is not the only way to define rights, it still might be the best
way to discover what rights there actually are.
Note that none of these, and especially neither of the first two, is
necessarily connected with deliberation. Democracy, defined for the
moment in a thin majoritarian manner, might exist in a number of
ways placing less stress on deliberation. Voting is one example, and so
are various other ways of registering preferences. But although serious questions can be asked about the virtues and vices of government
based on citizen preferences, Ackerman's agenda is different. He privileges public-regarding rather than private-regarding preferences,2 6
and he privileges the products of deliberative engagement over other
forms of articulation of public-regarding preferences.
So what are the special values of deliberation, above and beyond
what might be good about government based on the public-regarding
preferences of the entire citizenry? One possibility is that deliberation
might serve as a check on the nature of the reasons employed in decisionmaking. If private preferences count for less than public ones,
then the reasons behind preferences matter, and perhaps the only way
we can evaluate preferences is to have them publicly defended. Public
deliberation is thus a way to ensure that reasons are public-regarding,
although in some sense this is only a play on words. Even if we said
that only private-regarding reasons counted, public articulation might
still be the only way of determining that the reasons were of the qualifying kind. And if we saw deliberation as performing this kind of a
"testing" function, then certain concrete consequences might follow.
We would want deliberation to be more adversarial, more combative,
more oriented toward cross-examination, and in many other ways
designed to filter the reasons offered in public debate.
For someone who, like Ackerman, distinguishes good (for these
purposes) from bad (for these purposes) reasons, this testing function
of public deliberation is crucially important. It is thus not surprising
that others in the republican tradition, scholars like Frank

26. For an insightful critique of Ackerman's distinction among preferences, as well as a
strong criticism of Ackerman's history, see Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 759 (1992) (book review).
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Michelman,21 Suzanna Sherry,2 8 Cass Sunstein,29 and Martha Minow,30 place such a heavy emphasis on the judiciary. 31 If your primary materials are judicial opinions, then you are prone to see a world
in which the constraints of result-justifying and opinion-writing are
apparent. 32 Judges sometimes say "it won't write," meaning that
there are some reasons that will not stand the test of public explanation. Not all of political life imposes this test. Indeed, one way of
understanding the focus on deliberation is by seeing it as a way to
impose a valuable feature of judicial justificatory methodology on a
wider range of public acts, especially those with constitutional
implications.
Delibei;ation might serve another purpose, albeit one somewhat
less (or more contingently) related to the distinction between the private-regarding and the public-regarding reason. We might also think
of deliberation as a way of identifying the best policy, where the criterion for and definition of the best policy is at least conceptually independent of the deliberative process but where the deliberative
process might be the method most apt to locate and implement the
best policy. Take as an example the New Deal and its rejection of
laissez-faire. Now if we assume that the rejection of pre-New Deal
laissez-faire was a good idea independent of the process that produced
it, then one way of thinking about this constitutional moment is as the
product of a more reliable process. Normal politics produces results,
and public deliberation produces results, and the results of public deliberation might in the aggregate be better than the results of normal
politics.
The claim that public deliberation is methodologically superior for
identifying deliberation-independent social goods is an empirical
claim, and like all empirical claims it is contingent, both in the sense
that it might be wrong and in the sense that, even if now right, it might
be wrong at other times or in different places. There is a plausible
story that this empirical claim is not correct, 33 one that starts with a
variant of Gresham's Law and the view that bad arguments drive out
good. It then proceeds to the further premises that public deliberation
27. See Frank Michelman, Law'.s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Frank I. Michelman,
The Supreme Court 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. R.Ev. 4
(1986).
28. See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 1127
(1987).
29. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A PARTIAL CoNSTITUTION (forthcoming 1993).
30. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
31. Contrast Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 91 YALE L.J. 1591 (1988).
32. See Frank I. Michelman, Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a Contradictory
World, in JUSTIFICATION: NOMOS XXVIII 71 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1986).
33. Cf. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990).
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lowers rather than raises the quality of consideration, increases the
likelihood that bad arguments will be accepted and good ones rejected,
overly empowers the rhetorician and the demagogue, and exacerbates
the disempowerment of those already disempowered on the basis of
race, gender, class, wealth, physical attractiveness, and all of the other
features that distinguish the empowered from the disempowered.
This is not the end of the story, however, for much the same could
and does happen in normal politics. So if there is an argument against
the deliberative ideal, it is that normal politics tempers rather than
exacerbates or replicates the pathologies of public deliberation. Much
that takes place out of the public eye in normal politics might, for
example, involve reasonably well-meaning people's offering some
resistance to the demagoguery that might play better on the public
podium than it does in the offices of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the conference room of the Supreme Court. Normal politics, much of it taking place out of sight, might also, however, involve
officials' putting their hands in the till, literally and figuratively, to the
detriment of the public interest. And public comment might add more
than it subtracts from normal politics as a decisionmaking process.
But let us not forget that the New Deal itself was a product of normal
politics, even if Ackerman is right in saying that its constitutional embodiment was constitutional politics. Let us also not forget that normal politics produced the Equal Rights Amendment and public
deliberation rejected it (admittedly with the assistance of the threefourths rule), all of which is only to say that if we have a notion of
prepolitical desirability and undesirability, then it is an empirical question whether the increased deliberation that Ackerman celebrates gets
us there more often than the filtered, tempered, and dampened process
that Ackerman calls "normal politics." And if there is no reason to
celebrate large-scale deliberation specially, then a judge would have no
reason to treat the products of that process any differently from the
products of the process of normal politics.
But suppose that Ackerman, especially given his qualified hostility
to rights foundationalism, gets nervous when people talk about predeliberative or prepolitical desirability or soundness or truth. He might
then, in company with a range of thinkers from Holmes to Habermas,
believe that what is special about deliberation is that deliberation is the
process by which values, and not just our values, get created. But the
deliberation priority of Holmes was a product of a pervasive valueskepticism that Ackerman might wish to reject, 34 and that of
Habermas a philosophical construct presupposing an ideal speech situation that certainly Habermas himself does not suppose we are close to
reaching. 35 Aside from these two positions, however, there may not be
34. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
35. See generally JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
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any room left for other varieties of a view that takes deliberation as
soundness-constitutive rather than merely soundness-identifying. 36
The problems with taking deliberation as constitutive of political
truth are well known. If political truth is the product of deliberation,
then what is the normative purchase for what people say when they
are in the process of deliberating? Without an antecedent conception
of what might make one idea better than another, participants in a
deliberation are reduced to the articulation of personal preferences,
without having any way of convincing others that their preferences are
better.
So if the standard critique is sound, and political truth cannot be
defined in terms of deliberation, then there must be a gap between
political truth and constitutional truth, with the latter but not the former defined by the process of deliberation. But even apart from the
fact that this will hardly satisfy the rights foundationalist, a combination of empirical and normative questions still abounds. As Habermas
might be read to recognize, but Ackerman does not recognize, the normative entrenchment of the deliberative ideal when we are not in an
ideal speech situation runs the risk of entrenching the nonideality and
its components every bit as much as it holds open the possibility that
deliberation will transcend the harms that members of the deliberative
community might otherwise be inclined to impose on each other.
This is why Ackerman's historical approach is puzzling. Even
apart from whether he gives us good history or not, which I have no
ability to judge, he certainly does not give us an account of why our
history and our traditions should be the normative starting point for
how we now see our Constitution. Ackerman might think that this
entrenchment of the past is desirable because it is either substantively
good or because the very pastness of the past, and the very continuity
that its entrenchment would represent, are desirable in their own
right. 37 He appears to believe, however, that what is good about our
past is not only its pastness, and not only that it has produced some
good results, but also that it has embodied an ideal of deliberation that
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984); JORGEN HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., 1970); THOMAS A. McCARTHY, THE CRmCAL THEORY OF JORGEN
HABERMAS (1978); MARY HESSE, Habermas' Consensus Theory of Truth, in REVOLUTIONS AND
RECONSTRUCTIONS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 206 (1980). On the application of
Habermasian ideas to legal and constitutional argumentation and justification, see especially
ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE THEORY OF RATIONAL DISCOURSE AS THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (Ruth Adler & Neil MacCormick trans., 1989).
In the American context, see Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse:
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 601 (1990).
36. On this distinction, see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY 15-34 (1982) (book review).
37. For a powerful critique of this book along these lines, see Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of

Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REv. 918 (1992) (book review).
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ought to be admired and replicated. But deliberation as an ideal seems
self-evidently desirable only when all of the conditions of nonoppression in the deliberative setting are present, in which case whether we
need deliberation at all might be open to question. But if those conditions are not present, as they have not been throughout American history, then there are difficult empirical questions to confront. Even if
liberal dialogue and its consequent repression of selfishness is normatively desirable as ideal theory, 38 whether we would want to have it as
constitutional prescription before the conditions for its desirability are
satisfied is questionable. Do we now make ourselves better by searching for more fora for deliberation? Or do we recognize that deliberation now exists in a nonideal world where talk can oppress as well as
liberate, where deliberation caµ produce majoritarian tyranny as well
as individual liberation, and where the social identification of the leading participants in a deliberation is as likely to reinforce as to challenge the existing social structures that in this nonideal world
determine who speaks and who is spoken to, who controls and who is
controlled, and who has power and who is subject to it? Until we
confront these questions, the jump (rom deliberation as ideal to deliberation as policy is far more difficult than Ackerman has yet
acknowledged.

38. See Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5 (1989).

